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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
San Francisco Division 
GREGORY CLAYBORN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 TWITTER, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No. 17-cv-06894-LB  ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS   Re: ECF No. 50   
 
 
HANAN MEGALLA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 TWITTER, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
 
Case No. 18-cv-00543-LB   
 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS   Re: ECF No. 1 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 2, 2015, Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik killed 14 people and injured 22 others 
in San Bernardino, California. The Megalla plaintiffs were injured in the attack, and the Clayborn 
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plaintiffs are the surviving family members of those who died in the attack.1 The parties stipulated 
to the consolidation of the cases on December 6, 2018.2 
The plaintiffs allege that “[t]he terror attacks in this case were carried out by ISIS [the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria], a terrorist organization for years closely affiliated with al-Qaeda . . . .”3 
The plaintiffs sued Twitter, Google, and Facebook — all operators of online social-media 
platforms — on the ground that by allowing “foreign terrorist organizations” to use their 
platforms, they aided and abetted international terrorism and provided material support to 
international terrorists, in violation of several civil-remedies provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act 
(“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d), 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C, and resulting in negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death, in violation of state law.4 
The defendants moved to dismiss on the following grounds, among others: (1) the plaintiffs’ 
direct liability claims fail because they do not plausibly allege proximate cause; and (2) the 
plaintiffs’ secondary liability claims fail because they do not plausibly allege that ISIS committed, 
planned, or authorized the San Bernardino shootings or that the defendants knowingly aided or 
abetted the shootings or conspired with anyone involved in the attack.5  
                                                 
1 Clayborn First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) – ECF No. 50 at 5 (¶ 12), 9–10 (¶¶ 33–39); Megalla 
Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 5–6 (¶¶ 9–12). Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); 
pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.  
2 Initially, the cases were related, and then the parties agreed to consolidate them. Order – ECF No. 23; 
Minute Entry – ECF No. 67. As discussed at the December 6, 2018 hearing, the result of the 
consolidation is that the Megalla plaintiffs (who did not amend their initial complaint) are pulled into 
the Clayborn case (where the plaintiffs amended their complaint). Because the Clayborn amended 
complaint represents the plaintiffs’ best effort at pleading claims, the consolidation obviates the need 
for the Megalla plaintiffs to amend their complaint to conform to the Clayborn amendment. Based on 
the consolidation, this order cites primarily to the Clayborn complaint but cites sometimes to the 
Megalla complaint for plaintiff-specific allegations. Except for citations to the Megalla complaint, No. 
18-cv-00543-LB – ECF No. 1, citations in this order are to the briefs and docket in Clayborn, No. 17-
cv-06894-LB. 
3 FAC – ECF No. 50 at 4 (¶ 8). 
4 Id. at 8–9 (¶ 29), 10 (¶¶ 40–42), 119–127 (¶¶ 587–635). 
5 Mot. – ECF No. 53 at 13–26. The defendants filed a consolidated motion and reply, and the plaintiffs 
filed a consolidated opposition. Id.; Opp. – ECF No. 59; Reply – ECF No. 61; see Order – ECF No. 44 
(authorizing consolidated briefing); see Megalla Opp. – ECF No. 60 at 2 (the opposition in Clayborn 
“should stand for” the opposition in Megalla).  
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The court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaints with 
prejudice.  
 
STATEMENT6 
1. The San Bernardino Attack and the Aftermath of the Attack 
“On December 2, 2015, radicalized ISIS supporters Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik”  
— dressed in black outfits and face coverings, armed with AR-15 semi-automatic rifles and a 
.9mm semi-automatic handgun, and carrying “assembled pipe bombs” — “stormed the Inland 
Regional Center in San Bernardino, California.”7 “Farook’s former co-workers [were] assembled 
for a scheduled . . . training session” and a holiday party.8 Farook and Malik fired more than 100 
bullets, “indiscriminately spraying bullets into the crowd.”9 They killed 14 people and injured 22 
others.10 “During the shooting massacre, terrorist Tashfeen Malik declared on Facebook her 
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.”11 “After their massacre, 
Farook and Malik fled the scene in a rented SUV” and — after “leading the police on a chase” — 
“were subsequently killed in a shootout with the police.”12  A search of their home “uncovered 
what the[] [Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)] described as ‘pipe bombs, bomb making 
materials, and thousands of rounds of ammunition, along with several more guns.’”13 At the crime 
scene, the FBI SWAT [Special Weapons and Tactics] agents found that “the terrorists had 
evidently assembled and left a ‘suspicious package’ at the scene, which contained explosive 
                                                 
6 The fact allegations in this statement are from the Clayborn first amended complaint. FAC – ECF 
No. 50. 
7 Id. at 83 (¶¶ 424, 426). 
8 Id. (¶ 425).   
9 Id. (¶ 427). 
10 Id. at 75 (¶ 387), 84 (¶ 431).  
11 Id. at 83 (¶ 428). 
12 Id. at 83–84 (¶¶ 429, 432).  
13 Id. at 85–86 (¶ 441). 
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devices that miraculously failed to detonate and later were safely detonated by the bomb squad.”14 
The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) report said that the package “was likely intended to be 
detonated upon the arrival of the first responders[,] who would be giving aid to the wounded — a 
frequent, well documented practice in international terrorism incidents.”15 “FBI and DOJ 
investigators indicated that terrorists Farook and Malik left a remote-controlled toy car strapped 
with 3 rudimentary explosive devices at the scene of the crime. The remote was found with Farook 
and Malik upon their deaths.”16 “FBI investigators opined that the explosive devices, along with 
the remote control, w[ere] likely intended to be detonated against the first responders arriving to 
provide medical help to terrorist victims. This terrorist tactic has been outlined in Al Qaeda’s 
Inspire Magazine, as well as ISIS’s Dabiq Magazine, where in the international terrorist 
organizations have provided ‘tips’ and instructions to be utilized in preparation of such explosive 
devices similar to those found at the scene of the San Bernardino Attack.”17 
“Two days after the attack [on December 4, 2015], ISIS issued a statement claiming direct 
responsibility for the attacks, . . . declaring on the al-Baya Radio station, ‘Two followers of 
Islamic State attacked several days ago a center in San Bernardino in California, we pray to God to 
accept them as Martyrs.’”18  
On December 9, 2015, in Senate Judiciary Committee testimony, the FBI director James 
Comey said — based on the FBI’s investigation — that Farook and Malik were  “‘consuming 
poison on the internet’” and “had become radicalized to jihadism and to martyrdom via social 
media platforms available to them.”19 Director Comey characterized Farook and Malik as 
“‘homegrown violent extremists, inspired by foreign terrorist organizations,’” and he said, “‘When 
you invest in a narrative, a poisonous narrative that resonates with troubled souls, with unmoored 
                                                 
14 Id. at 86 (¶ 445).  
15 Id. at 86–87 (¶ 446).  
16 Id. at 87 (¶ 447).  
17 Id. (¶ 448). 
18 Id. at 84 (¶ 434);  
19 Id. (¶ 435).  
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people, and you do it in a slick way through social media, you buzz in their pocket 24 hours a day, 
saying come or kill, come or kill, that has an impact.’”20 
“The FBI confirmed evidence that Farook had face to face meetings a few years prior to the 
attack with five people the Bureau investigated and labeled as having ‘links to terrorism.’”21  Also, 
Farook and Malik “planned the attack for at least a year,” and “in the years leading up to the San 
Bernardino attack, Farook and Malik discussed ‘the jihad and martyrdom’ while they dated 
online.”22 “Malik pledged allegiance to the leader of ISIS just before she and her husband carried 
out the San Bernardino massacre. The final post on Malik’s Facebook page before the massacre 
used the word ‘we’ in the pledged allegiance to ISIS, an indication, a U.S. official said, that it was 
a statement on behalf of both killers.”23  
 
2. Additional Allegations About ISIS’s Involvement in the Attack 
ISIS is a terrorist organization and is a “designated Foreign  Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) 
under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 . . . .”24 “On December 
2, 2015, ISIS carried out a horrific terror attack in San Bernardino, California, murdering 14 
people . . . and injuring 22 more. . . .”25 The attack was intended to intimidate the civilian 
populations of the United States and other countries.26 “[A] major component of the San 
Bernardino Attack was the messaging disseminated by ISIS prior to, during, and after the events, 
in which ISIS stated its reasons for committing the terrorist attack against these countries’ 
civilians.”27  The attack “involved extensive planning, recruiting, organizing, training, preparation, 
                                                 
20 Id. at 85 (¶¶ 436–437). 
21 Id. (¶ 440). 
22 Id. at 77 (¶¶ 399–400); see id. at 77–78 (¶¶ 401–402) (online dialogue between Malik and Farook 
involving frequent communications about jihad and martyrdom). 
23 Id. at 78 (¶ 403.) 
24 Id. at 4 (¶ 8), 36 (¶¶ 161–165); see id. at 11–36 (¶¶ 46–160). 
25 Id. at 75 (¶ 387). 
26 Id. at 75–76 (¶ 388). 
27 Id. at 76 (¶ 389). 
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coordination, and funding.”28 That process involved the use of the defendants’ platforms — before 
and after the attack — “to intensify the fear and intimidation that ISIS intended to inflict by this 
mass casualty attack.”29 ISIS used the defendants’ platforms to “facilitate and accomplish all of 
those things.”30 More specifically, it used social media to carry out its terrorist activities, including 
calling for attacks on “the West.”31 Via social media, it urges its supporters to attack countries 
such as the United States (and others).32 
“Farook and Malik were radicalized by ISIS’s use of social media. This was the stated goal of 
ISIS. Farook and Malik then carried out the deadly San Bernardino Attack. Conducting terrorist 
attacks via radicalized individuals is a stated goal of ISIS.”33 “Farook and Malik were ISIS 
operatives,” and the San Bernardino attack “was direct action by ISIS.”34 “But for ISIS’s postings 
using Defendants’ social media platforms, Farook and Malik would not have engaged in ISIS’s 
San Bernardino Attack.”35 
 
3. ISIS’s Use of Social Media and the Defendants’ Profits from and Support of ISIS 
ISIS “has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and 
messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization.”36 “[U]ntil recently, 
ISIS maintained an official account on Twitter unfettered.”37 According to FBI Director James 
Comey, “ISIS has perfected its use of Defendants’ sites to inspire small-scale individual attacks, 
                                                 
28 Id. (¶ 390). 
29 Id. (¶ 391). 
30 Id. (¶ 392). 
31 Id. at 76–77 (¶¶ 393–398). 
32 Id. at 78–83 (¶¶ 404–423). 
33 Id. at 117 (¶ 569). 
34 Id. (¶ 570). 
35 Id. (¶ 574). 
36 Id. at 5 (¶ 13). 
37  Id. at 5–6 (¶ 14); see id. at 7 (¶ 17) (as of December 2014, ISIS had an estimated 70,000 Twitter 
accounts, at least 79 were official, and it posted at least 90 tweets every minute). 
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‘to crowdsource terrorism’ and ‘to sell murder.’”38 The complaint recounts ISIS’s extensive use of 
social media to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, connect its members, raise funds, plan 
and carry out attacks, publicize its exploits, and strike fear in others.39 This use includes messages 
directed toward the United States, France, and their allies.40  
“For years, ISIS and its affiliated media production and distribution networks operated and 
used official Twitter, YouTube [owned by Google], and Facebook accounts with little or no 
interference.”41 Despite media coverage, complaints, legal warnings, petitions, congressional 
warnings, and other attention, they continued to do so before the San Bernardino attacks.42 The 
defendants “knowingly provided material support and resources to ISIS in the form of Twitter, 
Facebook, and Google’s YouTube platforms, as well as by making personnel available to ISIS.”43 
ISIS used the defendants’ platforms to carry out terrorist activities, including the San Bernardino 
terrorist attacks.44  
The defendants profit from ISIS by placing ads on ISIS’s postings, and at least Google shares 
the ad revenue with ISIS.45 The defendants “incorporate ISIS’s postings to create unique content 
by combining the ISIS postings with advertisements selected by the Defendants based on ISIS’s 
postings and the viewer looking at the postings and the advertisements.”46  
Despite knowing that ISIS is a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the defendants provide their 
services to ISIS and its members and supporters.47 This allows ISIS recruits and members to 
                                                 
38 Id. at 5 (¶ 13). 
39 Id. at 5–9 (¶¶ 12–32), 36–45 (¶¶ 166–212). 
40 Id. at 78–83 (¶¶ 404–423). 
41 Id. at 8 (¶ 26). 
42 Id.  
43 Id. (¶ 27).  
44 Id. (¶ 28). 
45 Id. at 9 (¶ 31); id. at 95–102 (¶¶ 485–517). 
46 Id. (¶ 32); see also id. at 91 (¶¶ 457–459). 
47 Id. at 92 (¶ 464). 
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connect, “thus providing personnel to ISIS itself.”48 Despite complaints, the defendants 
determined “at various times” that ISIS’s use of the platforms did not violate their policies and 
permitted ISIS’s accounts to remain active (or removed only a portion of ISIS content).49 Even 
when they suspended accounts, they did not ensure that ISIS would not reestablish its accounts.50 
They could deny services to ISIS but refused to do so.51 
 
4. Allegations That the Defendants are “Information Content Providers” 
The defendants create the configuration for their sites that contain postings and 
advertisements.52 “In other words, a viewer does not simply see a posting . . . [or] just an 
advertisement. Defendants create a composite page of content from multiple sources.”53 Through 
their proprietary algorithms, the defendants create a page by selecting an advertisement to match 
with the page’s content.54 “Thus there is a content triangle matching the postings, advertisements, 
and viewers.”55 “Though Defendants have not created the posting . . . or the advertisement, . . . 
[they] have created new unique content by choosing which advertisement to combine with the 
posting with knowledge about the viewer.”56 
The defendants also recommend content to users based on the content and what they know 
about the viewer.57 For example, Google has recommended ISIS videos to users.58 
                                                 
48 Id. (¶ 467).  
49 Id. at 93 (¶ 469). 
50 Id. (¶ 470); see id. at 93–95 (¶¶ 471–484). 
51 Id. at 106–116 (¶¶ 538–565). 
52 Id. at 102 (¶ 518).  
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 103 (¶ 519).  
55 Id.  
56 Id. (¶ 521). 
57 Id. at 103–104 (¶ 523). 
58 Id. 
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By targeting advertisements based on viewers and content, the defendants are not “simply 
passing through the content of third parties; rather, Defendants have incorporated ISIS postings 
along with advertisements matched to the viewer to create new content for which Defendants earn 
revenue, and thus providing material support to ISIS.”59 
 
5. Allegations That the Defendants’ Platforms Have Unique Computer Architecture 
The defendants’ platforms and other services are provided to users via the defendants’ unique 
computer architecture.60  A user posts content, and the defendants’ computer servers receive it, 
distribute it to the user’s social network, post it to newsfeeds (or the equivalent), host it, store it, 
and allow its redistribution in various ways (such as posts, messages, links, sharing, and the 
like).61 The defendants’ algorithms operate as a matchmaker between like users by suggesting 
similar content to users based on their interests.62 By providing their platforms and other services 
to ISIS, the defendants “are providing to ISIS use of unique computer architecture, computer 
servers, storage and communication equipment, highly[ ]developed and sophisticated algorithms, 
and services that facilitate ISIS’s ability to reach and engage audiences it could not otherwise 
reach as effectively.”63 The platforms’ “usefulness to ISIS is not merely about content; ISIS uses 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube as tools to connect with others and promote its terrorist activity,” 
creating a virtual jihadist community.64 
 
6. The Claims 
The complaint has seven claims: (1) aiding and abetting international terrorism, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d); (2) conspiracy to aid and abet international terrorism, in violation of 
                                                 
59 Id. at 104 (¶ 525). 
60 Id. (¶ 526). 
61 Id. at 105 (¶¶ 527–533).  
62 Id. at 105–106 (¶¶ 533–534).  
63 Id. at 106 (¶ 535). 
64 Id. (¶¶ 536–537).  
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18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d); (3) provision of material support to terrorists, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2333; (4) provision of material support and resources to a designated foreign 
terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1) and 2333(a); (5) negligent 
infliction of emotional distress; (6) concealment of material support and resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339C(c) and 2333(a); (7) provision of funds, 
goods, and services to or for the benefit of specially designated global terrorists, in violation of 
Executive Order No. 13224, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); and 
(8) wrongful death.65 The defendants moved to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).66 The plaintiffs did not oppose the motion to dismiss 
claim two (the § 2333(d) claim for conspiracy to aid and abet international terrorism), claim three 
(the § 2339A claim for provision of material support), and claim six (the § 2339C(c) claim for 
concealment of material support) and conceded at the December 6, 2018 hearing that they would 
not pursue these claims.67 The claims at issue thus are claims one, four, five, seven, and eight. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 
which they rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A 
complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 
raise a claim for relief above the speculative level. . . .” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 
when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
                                                 
65 Id. at 119–127 (¶¶ 587–635). 
66 Mot. – ECF No. 53. 
67 Opp. – ECF No. 59; Reply – ECF No. 61 at 9, 12. 
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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
If a court dismisses a complaint, it must give leave to amend unless “the pleading could not 
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. 
Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). A court need not grant leave to amend if 
the court determines that giving leave to amend would be futile. See e.g., Beckman v. Match.com, 
LLC, 668 Fed. Appx. 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that amendment of claims [barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act] 
would be futile) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)); Rutman Wine 
Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 
ANALYSIS 
The defendants move to dismiss the complaints on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs do not 
plausibly allege that the defendants are directly responsible for an act of international terrorism 
and (2) the plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that ISIS was responsible for the San Bernardino 
attack and thus do not plausibly claim that the defendants are secondarily liable.68 The court grants 
the motion to dismiss on both grounds. 
 
1. Direct Liability 
The plaintiffs’ claims for direct liability are claim four, provision of material support and 
resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1) 
                                                 
68 Mot. – ECF No. 53 at 13–26.  
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and 2333(a)), and claim seven, provision of funds, goods, and services to or for the benefit of 
specially designated global terrorists, in violation of Executive Order No. 13224, 31 C.F.R. Part 
594, 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).69 The defendants contend that that the plaintiffs 
did not plausibly allege proximate cause, namely, a direct relationship between the defendants’ 
wrongdoing and the San Bernardino attack.70 The court dismisses claims four and seven because 
the plaintiffs did not plausibly plead proximate cause.  
The ATA’s direct-liability provision is as follows.  
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business 
by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or 
heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and 
shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees. 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). In Fields v. Twitter, Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed what is meant by the 
phrase “by reason of an act of international terrorism.” 881 F.3d 739, 744 (2018). It held that the 
“by reason of” language requires a showing of proximate causation. Id. 
In Fields, ISIS claimed credit for killing two government contractors in Jordan. 881 F.3d at 
741. (The contractors were shot by Abu Zaid, a Jordanian police officer. Id.) Their family 
members sued Twitter under § 2333(a), alleging that they were injured “by reason of” Twitter’s 
knowing and reckless provision of material support to ISIS in the form of Twitter accounts and 
direct-messaging services, thereby proximately causing the contractors’ deaths. Id. at 742. More 
                                                 
69 Both claims are predicated on the ATA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Claim four also is predicated on 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1) and claim seven also is predicated on 50 U.S.C. § 1705. The parties agree that 
the § 1705 claim is similar to the § 2339B(a)(1) claim. Mot. – ECF No. 53 at 20; Opp. – ECF No. 59 at 
15. The court thus “focuses on the ATA claims.” Cf. Taamneh v. Twitter Inc., – F. Supp. 3d –, No. 17-
cv-04107-EMC, 2018 WL 5729232, at *6 (N.D. Cal Oct. 29, 2018) (employing this approach). 
70 Mot. – ECF No. 53 at 14–18. The defendants also argued that the San Bernardino attack was not an 
act of international terrorism. Id. at 13–14. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C), to qualify as international 
terrorism, an attack must — among other elements — occur “primarily outside the United States” or 
“transcend national boundaries.” In a case with similar facts, the Eastern District of Michigan held that 
a mass shooting at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida was not an act of international terrorism, despite 
allegations that the shooter was radicalized by social media. Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 564, 
572–73 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-1426 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018). Because 
the proximate-cause issue is dispositive, the court does not reach this issue. Cf. Taamneh, 2018 WL 
5729232, at *6 (reached only the proximate-cause issue). 
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specifically, they alleged that ISIS (1) used Twitter’s direct-messaging feature to communicate 
with potential recruits and “for fundraising and operational purposes,” (2) used Twitter to recruit 
more publicly by posting “instructional guidelines and promotional videos,” and (3) used Twitter 
to fundraise and spread propaganda and fear by posting graphic media. Id. at 742–43.  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the direct-liability claims on the 
ground that the plaintiffs did not plausibly plead proximate cause. Id. at 744. It held that “to satisfy 
the ATA’s ‘by reason of’ requirement, a plaintiff must show at least some direct relationship 
between the injuries that he or she suffered and the defendant’s acts.” Id. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that proximate cause is established “when a 
defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation, and the injury 
at issue was reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted); see id. at 749 (foreseeability can be relevant to the proximate-cause analysis, 
but under the ATA, a direct relationship is required). The court held that because the plaintiffs 
pleaded “no facts indicating that Abu Zaid’s attack was in any way impacted, helped by, or the 
result of ISIS’s presence on the social network,” the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. Id. at 750. 
The plaintiffs’ direct-liability claims fail under Fields. The alleged links between ISIS and the 
shooting are ISIS’s allegedly claiming credit after the fact, Malik’s pledging allegiance to ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Farook’s and Malik’s alleged radicalization after they were 
exposed to ISIS content on the defendants’ online platforms. These allegations do not establish a 
direct relationship between the defendants’ acts and the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. ISIS’s alleged 
claiming of responsibility after the fact does not establish the direct relationship. Cf. id.  at 741, 
749–50 (ISIS also claimed responsibility); see also Copeland v. Twitter, Inc., No. 17-cv-05851-
WHO, 2018 WL 6251384, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2018) appeal docketed, No. 18-17327 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 6, 2018). Malik’s pledging allegiance to ISIS also does not plausibly plead a direct 
relationship between these defendants and the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Fields, 881 F.3d. at 744. 
Finally, the alleged radicalization by exposure to online content does not establish proximate 
cause. “Nothing in § 2333 indicates that Congress intended to provide a remedy to every person 
reached by these ripples [of harm that flow from the defendants’ provision of communication 
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services]; instead, Congress intentionally used the ‘by reason of’ language to limit recovery.” Id. 
at 749 (reaching this conclusion in part because “we are troubled by the seemingly boundless 
litigation risk that would be posed by extending the ATA’s bounds as far as foreseeability may 
reach.”). 
The plaintiffs suggest that this last allegation — the radicalization by exposure to online 
content — distinguishes this case from Fields.71 It does not. Fields is explicit on the issue: the 
possible ripples of harm are not the direct relationship between the social-media platforms and the 
injuries that is required for proximate cause. Id. A contrary conclusion poses boundless litigation 
risk and is not tenable given how interconnected communication services are with modern 
economic and social life. Id.  In sum, the alleged radicalization through exposure to online content 
does not establish the necessary direct relationship between the defendants’ conduct and the 
attacks on the victims. Id. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs do not plead any facts that show any direct recruitment of the attackers 
by ISIS through the platforms or their radicalization by actual exposure to ISIS content on the 
defendants’ sites. Absent concrete allegations such as these, other courts have held post-Fields that 
plaintiffs do not plausibly plead a direct ATA claim by alleging only that the social-media 
platforms radicalize users. See Copeland, 2018 WL 6251384, at *1–2, *6 (generalized allegations 
that an alleged ISIS soldier was radicalized because of ISIS content on social-media sites are no 
different than the allegations rejected in Fields); Taamneh v. Twitter Inc., – F. Supp. 3d –, No. 17-
cv-04107-EMC, 2018 WL 5729232, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal Oct. 29, 2018) (conclusory allegations that 
shooter was radicalized through social media are insufficient to support a plausible claim of 
contention of probable cause, especially given that there were no allegations that the shooter saw 
specific content on social media related to ISIS). The court follows these cases as persuasive. 
Cases that pre-date Fields also support this approach. See, e.g., Pennie v. Twitter, 281 F. Supp. 3d 
874, 891 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Absent any factual allegations regarding the Hamas postings that 
[the attacker] allegedly viewed and their relationship to the shooting, the assertions here that 
                                                 
71 Opp. – ECF No. 59 at 19. 
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Hamas radicalized [the attacker] are both too conclusory to be taken as true and too vague to 
establish proximate cause.”).  
Like the plaintiffs in Fields, the plaintiffs here “have not pleaded that [the defendants’] 
provision of communication equipment to ISIS . . . had any direct relationship with the injuries 
that [the plaintiffs] suffered.” 881 F.3d at 749. There is no connection between the provision of 
their online platforms and the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at 750. In short, there is no proximate cause. 
 
2. Indirect Liability 
The plaintiffs’ remaining claim for indirect lability is claim one, aiding and abetting 
international terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d). The defendants contend that 
they have no liability under § 2333(d) because the plaintiffs do not plausibly plead that ISIS 
committed, planned, or authorized the attacks or that the defendants aided and abetted the San 
Bernardino shooting.72 The court grants the motion to dismiss claim one on both grounds.  
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”) amended the ATA to provide for 
indirect liability:  
In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international 
terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been 
designated as a foreign terrorist organization. . ., liability may be asserted as to any 
person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who 
conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism. 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).  
First, the plaintiffs do not plausibly plead that ISIS “committed, planned, or authorized” the 
San Bernardino attack. See Copeland, 2018 WL 6251384 at *6–7. The three ties to ISIS (as 
discussed above) are ISIS’s allegedly claiming credit after the fact, Malik’s pledging allegiance to 
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Farook’s and Malik’s alleged radicalization after they 
were exposed to ISIS content on the defendants’ online platforms. Copeland also involved ISIS’s 
claiming credit after the fact, and that did not establish direct or indirect liability. Id. at *6–7. As 
                                                 
72 Mot. – ECF No. 53 at 22–26. 
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discussed above, Malik’s pledge does not establish ISIS’s role. And “[a]bsent evidence that ISIS 
itself planned or carried out the attack, facts that ISIS sought to ‘generally radicalize’ individuals 
and promoted terrorist[] attacks . . . are insufficient” to plausibly plead claims for indirect liability 
under § 2333(d)(2). Id. at *7 (citing Crosby, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 564). In sum, the plaintiffs do not 
plausibly plead that ISIS “committed, planned, or authorized” the San Bernardino attacks. 18 
U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). 
Second, the plaintiffs do not plausibly plead that the defendants aided and abetted the San 
Bernardino shooters. “Aiding-abetting [under the ATA] includes the following elements: (1) the 
party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the 
defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the 
time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially 
assist the principal violation.” Copeland, 2018 WL 625184, at *7 (quoting Halberstam v. Welch, 
705 F.3d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Here — as in Copeland and Taamneh — there are 
allegations only that the defendants were generally aware that ISIS used their services. There are 
no allegations that they intended to further ISIS’s activities or “at least w[ere] ‘generally aware’ 
that, through [their] actions, the defendant[s] ‘w[ere] thereby playing a ‘role’ in the 
[organization’s] violent or life-endangering activities.” Id. (citing and quoting Linde v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 329 (2nd Cir. 2018)); Taamneh, 2018 WL 5729232, at *11 (citing and quoting 
Linde, 882 F.3d at 329). There are no allegations that the defendants played a role in any particular 
terrorist activity or provided substantial assistance. Cf. Copeland, 2018 WL 625184, at *7; 
Taamneh, 2018 WL 5729232, at *12.  
The court grants the motion to dismiss claim one.  
  
3. State-Law Claims 
The plaintiffs’ state-law claims are claim six, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
claim eight, wrongful death. The plaintiffs’ failure to plausibly plead proximate cause for the 
federal claims defeats their state-law claims too, even considering that the standard for proximate 
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cause is more lenient under state law. Taamneh, 2018 WL 5729232, at *13; accord Copeland, 
2018 WL 6251384 at *8. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint. Because other 
courts have consistently rejected materially similar claims, the dismissal is without leave to amend 
and with prejudice. Copeland, 2018 WL 6251384 at *8; Taamneh, 2018 WL 5729232, at *13.73 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: December 31, 2018 ______________________________________ 
LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge 
                                                 
73 The defendants also argued that they are immune from liability under the Communications Decency 
Act , 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which immunizes “Interactive Service Providers” (such as the defendants) 
for claims based on third-party content. Mot. – ECF No. 53 at 26–31. The Fields court declined to 
reach the issue of whether § 230 protects social-media providers like the defendants here from liability. 
881 F.3d at 750. The Copeland and Taamneh courts did not reach the issue either. Copeland, 2018 WL 
6251384; Taamneh, 2018 WL 5729232. Under the circumstances, and having already written 
extensively on the issue, see Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 
5665670 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017), the court does not address the issue. 
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